It has long been recognised that 'Abd al-Qādir stood on the cusp of two worlds, that of the Maghribī past and its modern colonial future. His jihād responded to both and can be seen, rather like a coin, as possessing two faces: one which would have been comprehensible to Muslims in the area for many centuries and one which reflected the dilemmas facing many Muslims in the dār al-Islām in their ambiguous encounter with western modernity. Since writing my doctoral dissertation on interpretations of jihād in nineteenth century Morocco over a decade ago, a project to which 'Abd alQādir's jihād was central, my exploration of modes of legitimacy in al-Andalus and the western Maghrib has only confirmed the deeprooted importance of jihād in this corner of the Islamic world and emphasised the extent to which 'Abd al-Qādir's actions developed out of a rich and varied regional tradition. In this paper, I shall therefore reflect upon the ways in which 'Abd al-Qādir's jihād grew out of this regional heritage upheld most evidently in the 'Alawī sultanate of Morocco in the nineteenth century. This is not to deny 'Abd al-Qādir's largely ex post facto role in the development of Algerian nationalism or the importance of other aspects of his multi-facetted life, in particular his life-long commitment to Ṣūfism, but rather to emphasis again how he manipulated a central tenet of Moroccan religio-political discourse in his struggle, not only to resist French domination but also to create a rival sultanate to that of the 'Alawīs in Morocco.
1

The western Maghribī jihād tradition
While it is important to be wary of essentialising a complex and contantly mutating discourse, jihād and its synonym ghazāh appear in western Islamic political discourse from the Umayyad period (757-1031 CE) onwards. Most extant Umayyad chronicles date to the era of the Cordoban caliphate (929-1031), a period in which the more temporal ethos of the emirate was replaced by a heightened religio-political sensibility which conceptualised the Umayyad caliph as Islam's champion not only against Christianity but also against the deviation represented by Fāṭimid Shī'ism. It was thus natural for historians of the period such as Ibn al-Qūṭīya and Ibn Ḥayyān to praise the Umayyads retrospectively for their diligent attention to prosecuting the holy war against the 'infidel enemy' (al-'aduw al-kāfir) in the northern Iberian section of the dār al-ḥarb. Ibn alQūṭīya praises successive rulers for their dedication to such military campaigns while Ibn Ḥayyān's lengthier narrative is punctuated by regular and sometimes formulaic reports about their progress. 2 However, these sources also introduce a feature of paramount importance to later Maghribi religio-political discourse, the concept of jihād against internal dissention, bids for autonomy and rebellion against God's appointed ruler. This strand appears most clearly in relation to the historical depiction of the long rebellion of 'Umar b. Ḥafṣūn and his sons in what is now Andalucía. While Ibn Ḥayyān, for instance, shies away from placing a value-judgement on the numerous other insurgents (thuwwār) of the late ninth to early tenth centuries, he uses comparable terminology for Ibn Ḥafṣūn to that later used by Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān against 'Abd al-Qādir, such as corrupter of the body politic (mufsid), accursed (al-la'īn), 3 degenerate (fāsiq), 4 apostate (māriq, murtadd), 5 and even anti-christ (dajjāl) for his refusal to accept Umayyad authority. It was not coincidental that it was only with the defeat of Ibn Ḥafṣūn's sons in 316/928 that 'Abd al-Raḥmān III felt able to reclaim the caliphate and challenge the Fāṭimids for control of the western Maghrib.
The identification of opponents as apostates due to their resistance to divinely constituted authority had already appeared in Syrian Umayyad political discourse which relied upon the so-called ḥirāba verse in the Qur'ān to justify punishment of all kinds of opposition and public disorder:
The reward of those who wage war against God and his messenger, and strive to spread corruption (fasād) through the land is that they shall be killed or crucified, or their hands and feet cut off on opposite sides, or they shall be exiled from the land. That is their reward on earth and they shall receive great punishment in the afterlife. It is therefore unsurprising that their descendants, the Umayyads of Cordoba, should have maintained this paradigm and generalised it in the Islamic west when they reasserted their caliphal, and thus divinely sanctioned, status. The middle decades of the tenth century saw extensive Umayyad activity in the Maghrib against the spread of Fāṭimid influence and thus the potential spread of their religiopolitical constructs into the Berber hinterland. 'Abd al-Raḥmān III's chief commander, the fatā Ghālib, campaigned ceaselessly in the region well into the reign of al-Ḥakam II and Berber chiefs came to Cordoba on several occasions to make their obeisance to the Umayyad caliph.
7 As Safran indicates, one such Berber chief, Ḥasan b. Gannūn of the line of Idrīs, was described using almost the same vocabulary as that applied to Ibn Ḥafṣūn implying that his eventual submission was likewise the fruit of an internal jihād.
8 Simultaneously the Fāṭimid mission continued to promote its own mahdistic vision, ensuring that military activities across the Maghrib from Morocco to Egypt came to be seen as jihāds. This layered perception of jihād as a response to opposition and sectarian conflict as well as warfare against the non-Muslim other found repeated expression in the western Maghrib over the succeeding centuries in the Almoravid (al-Murābiṭūn) and Almohad (al-Muwaḥḥidūn) movements.
These movements have also been described as processes of islamisation in areas where the profession of Islam remained superficial, and thus the start of a repetitive process of rural islamisation and the promotion of urban-defined orthodoxies which was also By the end of the Almohad period much of the western Maghrib had been exposed to a series of spectacular jihāds which selfconsciously sought to reform the Muslim community, destroy ab- errant forms of the faith, and wage war against non-Muslims who threatened the western dār al-islām, the Normans, the Aragonese, the Castilians and the Portuguese. It is generally accepted that a significant factor in the rapid demise of both the Almoravid and Almohad empires was their failure to maintain their respective jihāds in al-Andalus. As a result the Muslim-Christian frontier moved rapidly southwards in the 1230s and 1240s putting the Muslims of North Africa in the frontline as never before. Regimes such as the Naṣrids in Granada, the Marīnids in Fes and the Zayyānids of Tlemsen thus felt increasing pressure to demonstrate commitment to some form of jihād.
However, this era also demonstrated the possible co-existence of jihadist language and realpolitik. Castilians, Aragonese, Naṣrids, Marīnids and Zayyānids made alliances which cut across religious lines as often as following them and employed Christian and Muslim mercenaries indiscriminately. Ibn Khaldūn excused the Muslim employment of 'Frankish' infantry as an essential complement to the cavalry skills of tribesmen, an argument military reformers in the nineteenth century Maghrib were keen to quote but which was not totally convincing to Muslims in either era.
11 While the Marīnids may have put forward their ancestor Maḥyū as a jihād martyr in al-Andalus and promoted also the concept that their dawla was a religious mission to overthrow the Almohads and reestablish the Sharī'a, observers could be forgiven for seeing Muslim political disunity as a major factor in the Christian advance southwards. 12 In this respect a pivotal text is that of Ibn 'Idhārī (d. c. 1295) whose Bayān al-Mughrib fī akhbār mulūk al-Andalus wa'l-Maghrib projects a 11. Muḥammad al-Kardūdī, Kashf al-ghumma bi-bayān inna ḥarb al-niẓām ḥaqq 'alā al-umma, MS D1281 Bibliothèque Générale, Rabat. 12. Shatzmiller shows that the Marīnids were not simply tribal war lords whose political discourse was devoid of religious content but that they portrayed themselves as men with a religious mission which endowed them not just with legitimacy but also baraka. The importance of this to the present article is the evidence of such a religio-political construct in the Maghrib by the late thirteenth century. Ibn 'Idhārī makes extensive use of the works of al-Rāzī and Ibn Ḥayyān in his history of al-Andalus but his vision of the Umayyad period puts much greater stress on jihād/ghazāh than they do. His work is chronological and for several years, the only information he gives is the military campaigns which took place, both against rebels and against the 'infidel'. He also makes explicit the deleterious effect of internal dissention for adequate defence of the Muslim frontier in a manner echoed centuries later by both 'Abd al-Qadir and Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān in their respective efforts to quell opposition to their rule. In his comments on the reign of the amīr 'Abd Allāh (r. 275-300/888-912), he describes al-Andalus as ruled by the 'party of Satan' (ḥizb al-shayṭān) as a result of which 'the jihād to the dār al-ḥarb ceased and the lands of Islam in al-Andalus became a dangerous frontier (al-thughr al-makhūf) ' . 13 He also maintained Ibn Ḥayyān/al-Rāzī's description of the Ḥafṣūnids as equivalent to unbelievers for their resistance to Umayyad authority.
A similar historiographical framework was adopted by alMaqqarī (c. 986-1041/1577-1632), a native of Tlemsen of Andalusi origin, in the third volume of his huge literary masterpiece the Nafḥ al-Ṭīb which deals with the chronological history of the Iberian peninsula and is called, 'A history of jihād against the enemy in al-Andalus'. Like Ibn 'Idhārī, al-Maqqarī took the opportunity presented by his writing to express the Maghribī political truism that political disunity opens the way for infidel attack. The historical sections of his work are about the rise and fall of al-Andalus and while he celebrates the Umayyad period as one of unity, he describes the ensuing period as disastrous due to the lack of an imām al-jamā'a and a united system of government (niẓām wāḥid). Instead dissention (ikhtilāf) and civil strife (fitna) enabled the Christian kings to steadily conquer Muslim territory.
14 A Muslim ruler's first responsibility was therefore to preserve internal unity in order to maintain a strong Muslim defence against external aggressors.
The fact that al-Maqqarī understood the political history of the period as a history of jihād is significant in itself and demonstrates the impact of the notion of jihād which had developed with the rise of the Sa'dī sulṭans in the Wād Dar'a en route to Marrakesh which they captured in 1525. By this time, the Portuguese had occupied several settlements on the Atlantic coast and the Spanish controlled Melilla, Oran and other places on the Mediterranean littoral making jihād an immediate concern rather than a distant reality for the inhabitants of the Maghrib. In response, the Sa'dīs judiciously promoted the idea that effective jihād required the leadership of a ruler, rather than a plethora of local independent mujāhidīn, and that this ruler should be a descendant of the Prophet, a sharīf. Sharifian religio-political theory thus blended contemporary concepts of the inherent baraka of the shurafā', popularised by the spread of Ṣufism throughout the rural Maghrib, with the idea that in the case of a sulṭān that baraka should be proven through performance in the jihād against the 'infidel'. The transfer of baraka from the religious to the political spheres was facilitated by the mahdistic claim cultivated by various Sa'dī rulers.
This construct gained support in southern Morocco and eventually in Fes, where the Sa'dī sulṭāns dislodged the Waṭṭāsids, partly as a result of their poor showing in the jihād and partly due to their lack of sharifian ancestry. However, the Sa'dī assertion of their right to rule and lead the jihād as shurafā' was not uncontested in Fes where the Idrīsī shurafā' had themselves been manoevering to take over from the Waṭṭāsids. 17 It should, of course, be noted that Ottoman concepts of ghazāh were also important throughout the Muslim Mediterranean in the sixteenth century, reinforcing local ideologies and giving them a maritime dimension whilst also competing with them. This was the political and religious world of which al-Maqqarī was part when he began writing about the cultural heritage of al-Andalus.
His biography further testifies to the broader geo-political context in which Maghribīs functioned prior to the imposition of modern state boundaries which began in the case of Algeria and Morocco with the Treaty of Lalla Maghnia in 1845 signed by the French government and the 'Alawī makhzan. Al-Maqqarī's nisba refers to the small village of Maqqara in the hinterland of Tlemsen but his distant ancestors hailed from al-Andalus and in more recent times had participated in the scholarly elite of both Tlemsen and Fes. One of his ancestors was chief qāḍī of Fes and a teacher of the famous Granadan minister Ibn al-Khaṭīb. Al-Maqqarī himself was imām and muftī of the Qarawiyyīn between 1613 and 1617 before the turbulent politics of late Sa'dī Fes led to his hasty departure for Ottoman Egypt and Syria, ostensibly to perform the pilgrimage. Among many others things, al-Maqqarī exemplifies the importance of jihād to political discourse in an area rather larger than contemporary Morocco and the persistent intellectual and cultural connections which linked Fes and Tlemsen, despite the latter's incorporation into the Ottoman Regency of Algiers.
Despite some Sa'dī successes against the Portuguese enclaves, most famously Santa Cruz de Agadīr in 1541, it proved impossible for them to completely dislodge the Iberian powers, as the continued Spanish possession of Ceuta and Melilla underlines. The 'Alawī sulṭāns who came to power in the 1660s therefore constructed their legitimacy on a rather similar platform to their Sa'dī predecessors, sharifism and jihād, although the mahdistic element was absent. Each sulṭān in turn proved his right to rule by demonstrating his devotion to the jihād which had the simultaneous effect of proving his martial prowess to his often recalcitrant tribal subjects.
19 This took a variety of forms from Mawlay Ismā'īl's sabre rattled outside various enclaves including Tangiers which was fortuitously evacuated by the English (who had inherited it from the Portuguese) in 1684 to Sīdī Muḥammad and Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān's maritime jihād, the local euphemism for corsairing but also its use to secure treaties depicted as advantageous to Muslims.
The perpetual problems associated with creating a centralised state in a tribal region also nurtured the ongoing elaboration of the concept of jihād against fasād, the corruption of the body politic, by tribes who failed to pay their taxes or demonstrated opposition of any other kind to the 'Alawī sulṭān. This became most pronounced during the troubled reign of Mawlay Sulaymān, a sulṭān whose martial abilities were questioned from the beginning and who endured not only the total breakdown of his authority but also his own ignominious capture by the Berbers of the Middle Atlas in 1819. In such circumstances, he pronounced not only that tribesmen who acted thus were apostates, but that jihād against them was more meritorious than jihād against the 'infidel'. 20 This was the religio-political context in which the French conquest of Algiers and dismantling of the Ottoman administration occurred in 1830, an event which was reported to the 'Alawī sulṭān a month after it happened and which immediately stirred up a mixture of jihādist sentiment and political opportunism across the region. was vague at best and subsisted with his commitment to Islamic reformism of a univeralist colour, and his geo-political engagement in an area which frequently encompassed the Rif mountains and other parts of the 'Alawī sultanate but only rarely included eastern Algeria, previously the eastern beylik of Constantine.
Moreover, although convenient to speak of his tribal following as 'western Algerian' and 'Moroccan', to categorise them in this way obfuscates their own layered identities as Arabic or Berber speakers and members of particular religious brotherhoods in which their loyalty and recognition of a sulṭān was often of secondary importance, registered most evidently in their willingness to pay taxes and to provide military assistance. Their political loyalties could also change with the season: several tribes moved between the territories of the Ottoman regency and the 'Alawī sultanate on an annual basis, a fact which bedevilled the drawing up of the treaty of Lalla Maghnia. 'Abd al-Qādir's frequent description by Europeans such as Churchill as 'Sultan of the Arabs' rather than the 'Algerians' and Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Qādir's tendency to speak of 'Arabs', 'Berbers' and 'Turks' within the central Maghrib (al-maghrib al-awsaṭ) confirms that even in the 1860s 'Abd al-Qādir was not unambiguously identified with Algeria. 23 What is particularly interesting about these biographies is the tension they exhibit between what might be called the 'Moroccan' and 'Algerian' dimensions of 'Abd al-Qādir's project which suggests that they were a stage in the gradual delinking of 'Abd al-Qādir from his pre-colonial western Maghribī context and his insertion into the nascent Algerian national narrative. Many traces of a pre-national paradigm intimately connected to 'Alawī religio-political discourse remain both in his biographies and in archival documents relating to the period. These fall into two interwoven categories: firstly, the ideological positioning of the amīr within a double-pronged jihād discourse familiar for centuries in the western Maghrib and upheld strongly by the 'Alawī sulṭāns and, secondly, the actual playing out of 'Abd al-Qādir's jihād in a geographical area that cut across the later national frontier.
When Algiers first fell to the French and Damremont's expeditionary force sailed to Oran, the first reaction of many in the beylik was to look to Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān, the 'Alawī sulṭān, for assistance. This was the reaction of the civilian population of Tlemsen, popularly known as the ḥaḍar who appealed to the hesitant sulṭān in a famous letter carried to Fes by a delegation loaded with gifts.
24
It was also the response of 'Abd al-Qādir's father, Muḥyī al-Dīn, who initially championed the acknowledgement of Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān across the region and offered his personal oath (bay'a) to the sulṭān's representative and cousin, 'Alī b. Sulaymān, when he arrived in Tlemsen shortly afterwards in October 1830. 25 The sources claim that this was because Muḥyī al-Dīn felt that he was too old to accept the proffered bay'a of the tribes of Gharīs but it also indicates the widespread legitimacy of the 'Alawīs in the western beylik of the regency of Algiers at this point.
26
The political choice appeared to be between Ottoman sovereignty rendered void by incapacity in the face of the French invasion and 'Alawī authority which seemed to promise a more realistic chance of military assistance. The 'Alawī attempt at direct rule from Tlemsen which entailed efforts to secure full allegiance from the population for jihād against the French in Oran was an unmitigated disaster. The Ottoman garrison refused to surrender the citadel to 'Alī b. Sulaymān and it proved impossible for his advisors and commanders to surmount tribal differences except for short periods. When the 'Alawī troops in Tlemsen mutinied after six months it was the last straw: Mawlay 'Alī withdrew to Fes in disorder supposedly passing leadership of the jihād to none other than Muḥyī al-Dīn. 27 This placed the marabouts of Gharīs in a unique position to explore the possibilities provided for them by the sharifian model of rule in the context of colonialism.
The right to rule as a mujāhid-sulṭān in the 'Alawī mould required sharifian, preferably Ḥasanī, ancestry, which both the Sa'dī and 'Alawī lineages claimed. However it had always been a disadvantage to them that they were not descendants of Idrīs, the most prestigious Ḥasanī shurafā' across the north. In contrast, the marabouts of Gharīs not only claimed a sharifian lineage, they also claimed an Idrīsī one. 'Abd al-Qādir's uncle had even written a defence of true sharifian lineages against the mutasharrifūn, marabouts who claimed to be shurafā' as a result of their learning or charisma. 28 This placed them in the same category as the scholarly and saintly Idrīsī shurafā' of Wazzān, Shafshāwan, Fes, Tlemsen and other northern towns of whom every dynasty from the Marīnids onwards had been wary, given the popular recognition of Idrīs I and Idrīs II as holy men as well as early rulers of the Meknes-Fes-Tlemsen corridor. Although Idrīsī lineage did not automatically engender a claim to political power, it made such a claim conceivable and it does not seem an accident that in his very brief history of the Maghrib, Muḥammad b. 'Abd alQādir finds space to mention the trips of both Idrīs I and Idrīs II from Fes to Tlemsen, a journey 'Abd al-Qādir would reverse, as well as detailing the Idrīsī credentials of his own family.
29
In 1832 Muḥyī al-Dīn passed the mantle of leadership to 'Abd al-Qādir, who was reported to have shown considerable and rather reckless bravery in a series of sorties against the French in Oran.
30
His stated reason was again his old age but he also seems to have wished to create a distinction between the mujāhid path upon which tain contexts, among the Qādirī tribes affiliated to Muḥyī al-Dīn's zāwiya and in correspondence with non-Muslim rulers and government officials. 34 Moreover the implications of the title amīr al-mu'minīn were not necessarily universalist in the nineteenth century. Muḥyī al-Dīn knew perfectly well that the Ottoman and 'Alawī sulṭāns used the title and on some occasions 'Abd al-Qādir's use of it was qualified: in a letter to the British consul in Tangiers he described himself as 'The commander of the faithful, sulṭān of the districts of Algiers, Oran and Tlemsen' while describing Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān as 'commander of the faithful' too.
35 Ironically, in non-Qādirī circles in the ex-Regency, 'Abd al-Qādir's legitimacy depended to a large extent on his inheritance of his father's position as deputy (nā'ib, khalīfa) of Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān, the 'Alawī sulṭān and imām. In the 'Alawī sultanate too, the widespead popularity of 'Abd alQādir rested in part on the assumption that he was waging jihād on behalf of the sulṭān whose reputation among his subjects was enhanced by the moral support he offered.
This created a situation of mutual dependency between Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān and 'Abd al-Qādir which only seemed contrived with hindsight. While Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān addressed 'Abd alQādir as his 'most revered son', the latter proclaimed his intention to retire to Marrakesh when a lack of enthusiasm among his tribal supporters enabled General Clauzel to occupy and burn his seat of operations, Mascara, in 1835.
36 'Abd al-Qādir also benefitted from being able to request scholarly approval for his own jihād against fasād from the prestigious 'ulamā' of Fes. The well-known fatwa of At the same time, 'Abd al-Qadir infused the 'Alawī notion of jihād with new content that responded to the exigences of the nineteenth century and Muslims' encounter with both modernity in the abstract sense and the practical reality of modern European military superiority. He was the first in the Maghrib to understand the importance of the military 'new order' (al-niẓām al-jadīd) and made strenuous efforts not only to create a modern army but to endow it with an industrial infrastructure. Most later commentators attributed this to his observation of developments in the Egypt of Muḥammad 'Alī Pasha which is a logical assumption but Leon Roches, who was with 'Abd al-Qadir from 1837 to 1839, also reports his avid questioning about European technology, organisation and government.
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In creating his niẓāmī army, however, 'Abd al-Qādir also appreciated better than most of his contemporaries the need to make it an Islamic institution by stressing its role as the only effective means to wage jihād. The idea that military modernisation along European lines might constitute jihād was exported back into the 'Alawī sultanate a decade later. In addition to the moral and religious backing 'Abd al-Qādir drew from the 'Alawī sultanate, it also proved to be a vital source of men and munitions as his relationship with the French soured and war became unavoidable. The easiest way to acquire military supplies was via Gibraltar and the northern Gharb port of Tetuan, a route followed by Colonel Scott who spent time with 'Abd al-Qādir in 1841. 41 The supply of munitions to 'Abd al-Qādir was one way for Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān to indicate the paternalistic relationship which existed between them. His permission to thousands of Rīf tribesmen to join the jihād and authorisation of public celebrations in Fes for 'Abd alQādir's 'victories' functioned in the same way.
The strenuous French protests which this aroused are not the topic of this article but they were instrumental in fracturing the tenuous alliance which existed between 'Abd al-Qādir and Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān in the 1830s. During the 1840s, the relationship between the two men changed to open antagonism as Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān ceased to see 'Abd al-Qadir as his deputy in the central Maghrib and began to view him as a dangerous rebel and rival for power in his own territory. The tensions between them were exacerbated by the direction of the French advance south and west in the area controlled by 'Abd al-Qādir which ultimately forced him to use the sultanate as a refuge. Concurrently, 'Abd al-Qādir's desperate situation in Algeria force him to make ever more strident demands for assistance from Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān and his subjects and to begin a publicity campaign castigating the sulṭān for failing to fulfil the obligations of a sharifian mujāhid ruler.
With the benefit of hindsight the sources from his Damascene period deny that 'Abd al-Qādir had any intention to overthrow Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān and become sulṭān of the west in his place but that was not the 'Alawī perspective in the 1840s. In September 1843 'Abd al-Qadir's camp, known as the Dā'ira, moved into the Rīf mountains. Although not its direct catalyst, this formed the background to the well-known Battle of Isly in 1844, the first major defeat of the 'Alawī army at French hands, and the ensuing Treaty of Lalla Maghnia in 1845 defining the border between the sultanate and French Algeria. Although this period saw 'Abd al-Qadir's last great campaign in Algeria during 1845 it was also the time of his most intense involvement in 'Alawī politics and engagement with the subjects of the sulṭān both of which were framed by regional notions of sharifian rule and jihād.
As the possibility of resisting the French pacification of the Algerian interior receded, 'Abd al-Qādir became an ever more 'Moroccan' figure, manouevering among the tribes of the Rīf, the Idrīsī shurafā' of Fes and the 'Alawī makhzan. Although he repeatedly insisted that his bay'a to Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān was intact and presented his criticism as naṣīḥa, this period culminated in his 1847 attempt to join up with resettled Algerian tribes and march on Fes. It is not clear whether he wished to establish a new Idrīsī sultanate, or engineer the replacement of Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān with an 'Alawī more amenable to supporting him, possibly the elusive Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Sulaymān who was in communication with him from Tafilalt, the home of the dynasty but also a place of internal exile well-away from the political centres of Marrakesh and Fes. 42 While the reports reaching Drummond Hay, the British consul in Tangiers, were contradictory in late August 1846 he reported to London 'the manifest desire shown by the inhabitants of both the northern and southern districts that Abd-el-Kader should overthrow the sultan and place himself or some other person whom he may elect on the throne of Morocco.' of the rebel (mufsid) disguised as a holy warrior (mujāhid) to counteract 'Abd al-Qādir's argument that Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān's failure to wage jihād rendered him illegitimate and his subjects' oath to obey him void. In a strong reprise of the vocabulary used to such effect by earlier chroniclers for Ibn Ḥafṣūn and Ḥasan b. Gannūn, 'Alawī correspondence asserted that 'Abd al-Qādir was not simply a rebel (fattān), but a devil (shayṭān) and a false prophet (dajjāl) leading Muslims to perdition. 44 This justified the makhzan's military action to chase him out of the sultanate as a jihād. Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān also employed the new argument, shared by the head of the Wazzāniyya-Ṭayyibiyya brotherhood, that the viciousness of the French onslaught rendered jihād against the 'infidel' too dangerous to be permissible. 45 Therefore the decision of the sulṭān to withdraw from direct fighting was the religiously correct one, not 'Abd alQādir's insistance on actions that amounted to communal suicide.
'Abd al-Qādir's departure from the sultanate in December 1847 and his subsequent surrender to the French provided Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān with the proof he needed: 'Abd al-Qādir had been in league with the French 'infidel' to destabilise the sultanate and destroy the community. 46 This partisan view was not, however, as important as the impetus which 'Abd al-Qadir's jihād/fasād had given to religio-political discourse in the sultanate. As a potential ruler in the 'Alawī mould, whether as a neighbour or as a rival, he contributed to 'Alawī religio-political debates in a way which a purely Algerian figure could not have done. Although there was a distinction between al-Maghrib al-Aqṣā and al-Maghrib al-Awsaṭ, there was no watertight national division. While there was certainly a hint of the national identities soon to develop, the subjects of the 'Alawī sultanate responded to 'Abd al-Qadir as an Idrīsī sharīf and mujāhid, forcing the makhzan to refine its own understanding of jihād and take a centuries-old discourse in new directions.
'Abd al-Qādir's contribution to Maghribī jihād discourse in the colonial era.
Despite the obviously 'Alawī religio-political constructs which 'Abd al-Qādir used to such effect during the 1830s and 1840s, religious imagery may be imaginary and conceal quite new social and political configurations. 47 Christelow suggests that this was indeed the case in the Mascara region in 1830 where a new horizontal 'class' of shurafā' was in the process of emerging and thus the moment ripe for the implementation of a political model akin to that of the 'Alawī sultanate. 48 However, 'Abd al-Qādir's jihād was also new in other ways of greater impact in the 'Alawī sultanate. Bellemare and Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Qādir both approvingly cited Maréchal Soult's comparison of 'Abd al-Qādir with Muḥammad 'Alī Pasha of Egypt and Shāmil, the Naqshbandī leader of Muslim resistance to Russian colonisation in the Caucausus. 49 All three appeared outstanding for their commitment not simply to resistance but also to modernisation. Both 'Abd al-Qādir and Shāmil emerged from the reformed Ṣufī milieu and combined the introduction of a modern niẓāmī army and small-scale industrialisation with the promotion of a pietistic but orthodox Islamic education beyond urban confines to a rural tribal population. 'Abd al-Qādir's vision of the jihād a sharifian sulṭān should undertake was therefore rather different to earlier understandings of the concept. While rejecting 'Abd al-Qadir's pretensions to power, the 'Alawīs picked up the concept of the niẓāmī army and made that the next stage in their own reconfigured jihād to restore public confidence in their regime and defend their frontiers against the constant threat now posed by the European powers. More obliquely, 'Abd al-Qādir also generated a public debate which made popular consensus essential to a ruler or mujāhid's legitimacy. While a degree of popular acceptance had always been necessary, the challenge 'Abd al-Qādir presented was a vocal one declaimed in the streets of Fes which explored not simply the rights but also the duties of a mujāhid-sulṭān faced with a colonial threat. Although Mawlay 'Abd al-Raḥmān succeeded in depicting 'Abd al-Qādir as the anti-christ whose honeyed words seduced the believers and split the staff of Islamic unity, the subjects of the sultanate spent the rest of the precolonial period striving to find a ruler who could adequately wage a jihād encompassing modernisation and anti-colonial resistance. He can thus be seen not only as a man inspired by the western Maghribī jihād tradition but also one who imbued it with new dynamism at the dawn of the colonial period. He thus contributed to Moroccan as much as to Algerian nationalism. 
